SUÁREZ ON THE FUNCTIONAL SCOPE 
OF THE IMAGINATIVE POWER

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RESUMEN

En contra la posición de Tomás de Aquino de la distribución de las funciones 
cognitivas de la distinción real de los sentidos interiores –sentido común, fantasía o ima-
ginación, potencia cogitativa y memoria o reminiscencia–, presento la reducción 
sustancial del alcance cognitivo del sentido interno simple, llamada fantasía, que realiza 
Francisco Suárez. Señalo las principales y diversas razones que implica la reducción del 
úmero de los sentidos interiores en la teoría de Suárez de la causalidad eficiente del 
alma y su concepto específico del intelecto y su objeto.

Palabras clave: Tomás de Aquino, alcance funcional, sentidos internos, Suárez.

ABSTRACT

Against the background of Thomas Aquinas’s distribution of cognitive functions 
to four really distinct interior senses – the common sense, the phantasy alias the imagi-
nation, the cogitative power and the memory alias the reminiscence –, I present 
Francisco Suárez’s substantial reduction of the cognitive scope of his single internal 
sense, which he calls phantasia. I will claim that the main reasons for such curtailing 
which is not concerned only with the reduction of the number of interior senses are 
Suárez’s theory of the efficient causality of the soul and his specific concept of the 
intellect and its object.

Keywords: Aquinas, functional scope, internal senses, Suárez.
I. INTRODUCTION

In Aristotelian-scholastic cognitive psychology the interior senses constitute an important link between the external senses and the intellect. However, for a significant line of medieval and post-medieval scholasticism these senses function not only as mere transmitters of the sensory data flowing from the external senses to the intellect, but they also detect the intentions of sensibles which are concealed to the external senses—e.g. the intention of inconvenience, as in the example of the intention of the wolf’s hostility revealed by the sheep’s estimative power—and they also generate a number of quasi-intellectual operations. In the case of human senses, one may speak about the immersion of rationality in sensuality. In line with what has been called the Axiom of Continuity, exemplified by the hierarchically ordered powers of the human soul—the highest part of the lower faculty “touches” on the lowest part of the higher faculty, whereby the lower faculty gets epistemologically elevated in its operations—, the internal senses can exercise judicial, inferential and discursive (syllogistic) acts not dissimilar to intellectual operations. Moreover, the sensory appetite, which follows the apprehension of the interior senses, will be able to execute volitional operations parallel to the operations of the will. Accordingly, the sensory appetite will rightly be called “free”, and, as Aquinas says, capable of becoming the immediate subject of pardonable sin (peccatum veniale). Moreover, regardless of this Axiom, some scholastics, e.g., Adam Wodeham (1298–1358), even went as far as to attribute such “intellectual” operations to beastly interior senses. Others, e.g., Alhazen (965–1040) and his Latin followers called perspectivi, on the contrary, came to enlarge the scope of the interior senses’ apperception from the opposite side. They claimed that the operations of the external senses are incomplete and thus they as such do not constitute the proper external sensorium. This sensorium is to be located in the ultimum

1 This study is a result of the research funded by the Czech Science Foundation as the project GA ČR 14-37038G “Between Renaissance and Baroque: Philosophy and Knowledge in the Czech Lands within the Wider European Context”.


3 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Opera omnia, STh I-II, q. 74, a. 4, ad 3 (Rome: ed. Leonina, t. 7, 1892), p. 38.

sentiens situated in the forefront of the brain, where the common sense was usually seated.⁵

Considering this broad functional scope of the internal senses, it is not surprising that a number of scholastics took for granted the existence of four, five, or even six really distinct internal senses, which individually exercised different cognitive functions that can in no way be attributed to a lesser number of powers. From this point of view, a mere cursory look at Francisco Suárez’s Disputation VIII entitled De sensibus interioribus from his De anima Commentary, where his theory of a single interior sense (phantasia) is presented, will give us a clear pre-understanding of the Jesuit’s view. In my paper, I will present Suárez’s substantial reduction of the cognitive scope of the phantasia, especially against the background of Aquinas’s distribution of the number of cognitive functions to the interior senses. I will claim that the main reasons for such curtailing are the distinctive efficient causality of the soul and Suárez’s specific conception of the intellect and its object. In both, I will argue, the Jesuit markedly differs from Aquinas.

II. AQUINAS ON THE NUMBER AND FUNCTIONAL SCOPE OF THE INTERIOR SENSES

Notoriously, Aquinas advocates a theory of four internal senses, namely the common sense, the phantasy alias imagination, the cogitative power and the memory.⁶ The Angelic Doctor shows that these powers must be taken as really distinct since the following two criteria hold. 1) For each distinct type of sensible object, there must be a distinct internal sense to apprehend this object. If we get typologically distinct objects, these objects must be attributed to really distinct powers. 2) Receptive powers always differ from retentive powers. Reception substantially differs from retention. Following the first criterion, he states that while the common sense and the phantasy apprehend the sensibles perceived by the external senses (the proper sensibles, such as colour in the case of sight, and the common sensibles, such as magnitude, figure, etc.), the cogitative power and the memory go deeper. They detect the hidden “intentions”, say, of hostility or amity which are not sensed by the external senses. In line with the second standard, Aquinas says that while the common sense and the cogitative power

apprehend only objects existent **hic et nunc**, the phantasy and the memory cognize them **in absentia** or, in the case of composite sensibles such as a golden mountain, even in their nonexistence. While the former two faculties cognize their sensibles intuitively, the latter two grasp them abstractively.

Let me start with the common sense. Three main functions are usually attributed to this faculty, the first two being explicitly endorsed by Aquinas. First, the common sense must be posited as a distinct faculty, since the external senses are limited to the sensation of the proper sensibles (and their modifications such as the common sensibles)—sight perceives only colour and light, etc.—and thus they cannot discern (and connect) between the sensibles of the external senses. While the visual power discerns between white and black, it cannot discern white and sweet, since the latter stands beyond the scope of its proper sensible. Also, the visual power cannot synthesize the different proper sensibles into a single composite sensible comprising the sensibles of white, sweet, etc., of the sensible aggregate integrally experienced as milk. Second, since the external senses are teleologically related to their proper sensibles, they cannot be regarded as powers able to reflect upon their own operations. However, since such self-awareness is a clear factum of both human and beastly lives, a power accounting for such a function must be posited. As Aquinas says, that power must be the common sense. Scotus stated that an act of seeing imprints its own proper sensible species on the common sense. Only the species of this act is retained and later it can be recalled by the memory. Memoria remembers not only the sensed sensibles but, as its proximate object, also the operations of the external senses. Accordingly, **sensus communis** is to be seen as the source of consciousness. Before the activity of the common sense and due to the essential passivity of the external senses connected with their essential orientation to the external sensibles, the external senses operate “unconsciously”. Third, Albert the Great, Averroes and Alhazen defended the thesis that the common sense (and not the external senses) detects the common sensibles. Albert argued that the discerning and synthesizing activities of **sensus communis** would be impossible without the assumption of an adequate principle. If identity and diversity are regarded as secundum esse, the principles of the identity of the synthetic activity are magnitude and figure and the principle of diversity is number. If identity and diversity are taken secundum fieri, the principles will be

7 Aquinas, *STh*. I, 78, 4, ad 2, 256: “… a quo [the common sense, D.H.] etiam perципiantur intentiones sensuum, sicut cum aliquis videt se videre. Hoc enim non potest fieri per sensum proprium, qui non cognoscit nisi formam sensibilis a quo immutatur; in qua immutatione perficitur visio, et ex qua immutatone sequitur alia immutatio in sensu communi, qui visionem percipit.”

quiet and motion. In either case, the common sense apprehends the common sensibles.⁹

Provided that the phantasy is considered in the narrow and specific sense (and not in the generic sense including the imagination, the cogitative power and the memory), its main telos is to retain the species that had been synthetically processed by the common sense. While the common sense perceives its objects in their presence, the phantasy is detached from this presence. The phantasy is characterized as a storehouse of sensible species. From these species it then elicits images representing absent objects. However, as Aquinas shows, these images do not bear the mark or “intention” of pastness. Moreover, in the context of his critique of Avicenna’s distinction between the active and the passive senses, Aquinas states that the same power, which can be called the phantasy sive imagination, can also exercise the operations of composition and division of the species that have been received by the external senses. By virtue of such creative activity this power can produce composite species representing nonexistent (fictitious) beings.¹⁰

As recent Aquinas scholars agree,¹¹ for Aquinas the crucial interior sense is the vis cogitativa. Given its proximity to the intellect, it is no wonder that Aquinas calls it “ratio particularis” [italics; D.H.]. Clearly, several proto-intellectual acts are attributed by Aquinas to this capacity. Like the vis aestimativa of the brutes, it detects the unsensed intentions of convenience/inconvenience by means of a species non sensata.¹² Nevertheless, in addition to these “practical

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¹² It was George Klubertanz who claimed that the human vis cogitativa or, as he says, the discursive power is concerned only with the singulars of action (operabilia) as standing under the intelligible light of reason. Aquinas’s cogitativa is for him operative only in the order of practical knowledge and is restricted to discerning the useful from the harmful. Its function is limited to the determination of an action, which is to be undertaken hic et nunc by comparing individual intentions that are standing under the universal principle of practical reason. For this interpretation cf. George P. Klubertanz, *The Discursive Power. Sources and Doctrines of the Vis Cogitativa according to St. Thomas Aquinas* (St. Louis: The Modern Schoolman, 1952), 202–3, 205, 256–7 and elsewhere. For a
intentions”, it also reveals the incidental sensibles (sensibilia per accidens), namely the sensibles that are accidentally united with the proper and the common sensibles. While the common sense is connected with this or that bundle of proper and common sensibles, the cogitative power goes behind this bundle of sensible qualities by adding an interpretative moment to our visual experience. This “interpretation” consists in detecting particular intentions, such as this or that individual substance. The cogitativa operates when we see this white object (as Aristotle says in De anima) as the son of Diaries. Importantly, being elevated by the power of the intellect, this particular reason apprehends an individual substance as an instance of a certain kind. It apprehends this white as “this human”. Consequently, this power disposes phantasms for the universalizing operation of the agent intellect. The proximity of the cogitativa to the intellect also capacitates this power to the composition and division of particular intentions. Thus, this power generates judgments such as “Peter is not Paul” or infers the practical conclusion “Fac hoc!” in a practical syllogism. All in all, it operates discursively in respect to the particular intentions. In consequence, the sensitive appetite that comes from its operations can be regarded as a voluntary capacity, which is “free” in such a way that it can become the subject of virtue or can commit a pardonable sin (peccatum veniale).

Beside the vis cogitativa that detects and alters these intentions, there must also be another power that retains them. While the imagination is a storehouse of species sensata, memoria is a “treasure house” of unsensed species. One of these abstract intentions is also the intention of pastness. That is why ratio praeteritii is cognized only by the memory and not by the phantasy sive critique of this narrow interpretation of the cogitativa in Aquinas, see Lisska, Aquinas’s Theory of Perception. An Analytical Reconstruction. Lisska argues that “… the vis cogitativa, at its core, has more than the practical function Klubertanz puts forward” (ibid., 245) and “… is far more important than Klubertanz acknowledged” (ibid., 317). He makes it clear that the cogitativa is the faculty by means of which we are first of all aware of a per accidens object of sensation, i.e., a primary substance, as an instance of a natural kind. The cogitative power, which detects the unsensed intentions of an accidental sensible and further structures a corresponding phantasm, is a crucial vehicle for the abstractive process of the agent intellect in the order of speculative knowledge in general (ibid., 258–261, 317). As regards this broad account of Aquinas’s cogitative power, which is seen as “the real center of our interior life”, cf. also Corneliio Fabro, “Knowledge and Perception in Aristotelico-Thomistic Psychology”, The New Scholasticism 12/4 (1938): 337–365, esp. 352–3.

As stated by Aristotle in De anima (418a20–3), the son of Diaries is an incidental sensible because it is accidentally united to this white colour. See Aristotle, On the Soul (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2000), book II, ch. 6, 103.

imagination. Importantly, in line with the discursive procedures of the cogitativa, the human memory acquires a new quality that makes it the power of reminiscence (reminiscentia). As Aquinas says: “As to the memorative power, a human knower has not only memory, as other animals have, in the sudden recollection of the past, but also reminiscence, by seeking syllogistically, as it were, for a recollection of the past by the application of individual intentions.”

III. SUÁREZ’S REDUCTION OF THE NUMBER OF INTERIOR SENSES

As I have already mentioned, Suárez advocates a theory of a single sense that can be regarded as plural only conceptually, i.e., according to the various acts it generates. As the intellect can be regarded as multiple, i.e., as practical, speculative, reason (ratio) or intellectual memory, on the basis of its operations, so the interior sense can be partitioned into the common sense, estimative power, phantasy, imagination and memory according to their different acts. In this reduction, Suárez employs two criteria. First, senses are not to be multiplied if one can perform more than another; they are to be multiplied only if one cannot exercise the operation of the other. Second, no more senses are to be posited in humans than in (perfect) brutes. If some operation is more perfect in humans than in brutes, it is not a reason for power multiplication because the human operation is to be regarded as coming from the higher perfection of the same faculty, rather than from a different power. This second ground had led Aquinas to identify the phantasy conceived as a storehouse of species with that framed as the compositional (creative) power.

Suárez’s attitude to the two criteria employed by Aquinas in his “deduction” of four senses is clear. He denies both. He rejects both the criterion based on the distinction between abstract and intuitive knowledge and the one established by the distinction between sensed and unsensed species. As to the first, Suárez denies it by claiming that a power which apprehends its object in its absence

15 Aquinas, *STh. I*, 78, 4, 256: “Ex parte autem memorativae, non solum habet memoriam, sicut cetera Animalia, in subita recordatione praeteritorum; sed etiam reminiscientiam, quasi syllogistice inquirendo praeteritorum memoriam, secundum individuales intentiones” [italics; D.H.].
16 Francisco Suárez, *Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in libros Aristotelis de anima*, edited by Salvador Castellote (Madrid: Editorial Labor, tomo 3, 1991), disp. 8, q. 1, n. 24, 44–6 (further only: *DA* 8, 1, 24, t. 3, 44–6). For the clear exposition of this theory see also James B. South, “Francisco Suárez on Imagination,” *Vivarium*, 39/1 (2001): 119–158. Although South’s study compares at length Suárez’s theory of internal senses with Aquinas’ doctrine, it deals only marginally with the issue of the Jesuit’s reduction of the functional scope of the imaginative power.
17 *DA* 8, 1, 15, t. 3, 32.
18 *DA* 8, 1, 16, t. 3, 32–4.
first had to perceive the same object in its presence. In line with his first “reductionist” criterion, a power which can exercise a more perfect operation, i.e., abstract cognition, can also exercise a less perfect operation, namely intuitive cognition. There is no reason to posit a common sense, which apprehends intuitively, and a phantasy, which cognizes abstractively, as two distinct powers. *Mutatis mutandis*, there is no reason for the distinction between an estimative power apprehending intentions *hic et nunc* and a memory, which retains them. The phantasy can do both jobs.\(^{19}\) As to the second criterion, Suárez rebuts the existence of unsensed species with two arguments.\(^{20}\) First, unsensed species are redundant. The sheep instinctively apprehends the intention of the wolf’s hostility by the same species through which it represents the wolf’s other qualities, such as its colour, shape, etc. Second, unsensed species are altogether impossible entities. If sensed and unsensed species were distinct, they would have to be mutually separable. Clearly, there can be no species representing the wolf *sub ratione inimici* without representing it *sub hac figura, sub hoc colore*, etc. In fact, there is only one possible way to explain the representation of these intentions. They are *modes* grounded in the sensed species. As in other issues,\(^{21}\) also in this case Suárez employs the notion of mode. Concluding, estimative power and memory are not to be distinguished from the phantasy. The phantasy can apprehend both the sensibles and their modes, which represent these intentions.\(^{22}\)

IV. SUÁREZ’S REDUCTION OF THE FUNCTIONAL SCOPE OF INTERIOR SENSE APPREHENSION

4.1. COMMON SENSE

Suárez notes that there is actually only one kind of operation that is the “raison d’être” of the existence of the common sense as being conceptually distinct from the other senses. It is the act of discriminating between the sensibles of the different senses, and, vice versa, the act of synthesizing them. This sense is called “common” due to the community of its object. Its *radius operandi* extends to all the kinds of sensibles that are acquired by the external senses. It is not called common because it apprehends the common sensibles.

\(^{19}\) *DA* 8, 1, 17, t. 3, 34–6.


\(^{21}\) For Suárez’s other uses of the notion of *modus* see below.

\(^{22}\) *DA* 8, 1, 19, t. 3, 38.
Contrary to Albert, Suárez stresses that the interior sense capacity can perceive only those objects, which have been perceived by the external senses, and nothing more. Although the common sensibles are not sensibles per se primo but only sensibles per se secundo, they, unlike the incidental sensibles, directly affect the external senses. At the same time, Suárez rejects the view of Scotus, according to which the common sensibles affect the external senses by means of their own species. The Jesuit’s argument is based on the assumption of the teleological inclination of each external sense to its own unique proper sensible object. Accordingly, the visual capacity has a transcendental “coaptatio” to its (single) proper sensible, by which it is specified, namely to colour (and light). This power cannot be specified, say, by size since this sensible can be perceived by other powers. These sensibles have to be sensed only by means of a modification of the sensible species of the proper sensible. In analogy to the abovementioned modes of unsensed intentions, also in this case Suárez utilizes the notion of mode.

The notion of modus is also employed in Suárez’s theory of sensorial self-awareness. Suárez agrees with Aquinas that no sense power can properly and distinctly cognize its own operation since such reflection exceeds the capacity of a material power. (By the terms “properly and distinctly” Suárez means a cognition, in which the act is conceived as the object by a higher act of the same power; in analytical philosophy this kind of self-awareness by means of a different act is often called Higher-Order Self-Awareness). Nevertheless, Suárez differs from Aquinas in his other conclusions. Contrary to Aquinas (and Scotus), he says that by its proper act no sense power can perceive the act of another sense by means of its proper species. Unlike the intellectual awareness of its own acts, the interior sense cannot perceive the operations of the external senses through its own species since such self-awareness, in general, exceeds the radius operandi of sensory powers. If an act of external sensation imprinted its species onto the interior sense, we could form a proper and distinct concept,

23 DA 6, 1, 4, t. 2, 458–460.
24 DA 6, 1, 11, t. 2, 466–8.
25 DA 6, 1, 7, t. 2, 460.
26 DA 6, 1, 8, t. 2, 462.
27 Aquinas, STh. I, 87, 3, ad 3: “Ad tertium dicendum quod sensus proprius sentit secundum immutationem materialis organi a sensibili exteriori. Non est autem possibile quod aliquid materiale immutet seipsum; sed unum immutatur ab alio. Et ideo actus sensus proprii percipitur per sensum commune.”
and, consequently, we could explicate the nature of this operation. But we experience that we cannot do that. Besides, if both the species of the sensible object and the act were imprinted onto the common sense, two numerically different acts would have to be elicited by that power. Again, this is not in compliance with our experience.\textsuperscript{29}

However, the disproval of such a Higher-Order Theory does not mean that Suárez also dismisses the “non-reflexive” version (i.e., Same-Order Theory). On this view, a sentient apprehending a sensible is \textit{in actu exercito} (concomitantly) aware of this act as well. To obtain this kind of self-knowledge no higher act, directed to the lower act, needs to be posited.\textsuperscript{30} Suárez agrees that this kind of self-knowledge obtains in all perceptual acts.\textsuperscript{31} However, he adds that such self-awareness is not caused by the material (sense) powers but rather by the vital soul, which is “present” in all the (attentive) operations. As the intrinsic principle of all vital operations, the soul’s efficient agency cannot be lacking in the operations of all the senses.

This kind of concomitant self-awareness is not the end of the story, though. This kind of apprehension does exclude what Suárez calls the special self-awareness of the interior sense. How does he conceive this special self-awareness? Of course, such self-knowledge cannot be based on the premise of a direct imprint of the species of the act onto the interior sense. Suárez makes clear that the only way to conceive it is, again, to employ the notion of \textit{modus}. The phantasy can apprehend the operation of the external senses through modifying the sensible species of the external sensibles.\textsuperscript{32} But how is such modification to be understood? In order to explain it, I must briefly present how Suárez understands the production of intentional species in the higher powers, such as the interior sense and the intellect.\textsuperscript{33} First of all, Suárez states that the intentional species of the higher cognitive powers are produced neither by the efficient causality of the species of the external senses nor by the causal efficiency of their operations. They cannot be caused in that way since a lower (less perfect) power cannot cause a more perfect effect in a higher faculty. Throughout the \textit{De anima Commentary}, Suárez underscores the a-causal or what is also called “occasionalist” manner of production of the higher species. The operation of a lower capacity can serve at most as an “occasion” or a quasi-

\textsuperscript{29} \textit{DA} 6, 4, 6, t. 2, 508–510.
\textsuperscript{30} For the definition of both kinds of self-awareness cf. \textit{DA} 6, 4, 2, t. 2, 502–4.
\textsuperscript{31} \textit{DA} 6, 4, 7, t. 2, 510.
\textsuperscript{32} \textit{DA} 6, 4, 8, t. 2, 510.
\textsuperscript{33} For this also see Daniel Heider, “Late Scholastic Debates about External and Internal Senses: In the Direction of Francisco Suárez (1548–1617)”, forthcoming in \textit{The History of Philosophy of Mind between 1300 and 1600}, ed. Stephan Schmid (London: Routledge, 2018).
exemplar cause for the production of a higher species. In the present case, the acts of external sensation produce the emanation of the species from the power of phantasy due to their common rooting in the common soul with the other powers.  

And since the acts elicited by the external senses are “marked” by the concomitant self-knowledge caused by the active soul inherent in their operations, the “emanated” species of the phantasy must bear the mark of the act’s concomitant awareness as well. Most importantly, the fact that the interior sense comes to know the operations of the external senses in this “special” way is not merited by the interior sense or, in other words, it is not the result of this sense’s capacity to go “beyond” the capacity of apprehending external sensibles. Such apprehension is a “relict” inherited from the act generated by the external senses themselves, or more precisely, by the external senses together with the vital soul. In this sense, Suárez is clear that it cannot be said that, comparatively to the external sense, the common sense brings an additional cognitive or interpretative value as Aquinas had suggested. All is due to the prior activity of the vital soul.

4.2. COGITATIVE ALIAS ESTIMATIVE POWER

Leaving aside the functions of the phantasia in the narrow sense, both of which are ascribed to this power by Suárez as well, the fundamental difference lies between Aquinas’s cogitativa and what Suárez prefers to call the aestimativa. As I have said, for Aquinas the cogitative power is a quasi-intellectual capacity, which is elevated in its radius operandi by its proximity to the intellect. Importantly, the cogitativa can perform discursive operations with respect to incidental sensibles, such as the substance of Peter. This approximation of the cogitativa to the intellect is all but Suárez’s position. What Aquinas calls “particular reason”, Suárez likens to the instinctive cognition of (perfect) brutes. No doubt, in humans such spontaneous cognition and behaviour is often governed by the intellect and the will. However, this does not mean that the estimative power of itself, as the ontological subject, can perform the abovementioned operations. Why is it so? And how does Suárez deprive the phantasy, virtually containing the functions of the aestimativa, of the functions attributed by Aquinas to the cogitativa? His strategy is clear: All these operations are to be relegated to the intellect.

Suárez agrees that incidental sensibles are sensibles and that, unlike God who is known only discursively from the (sensible) effects, they are cognized

34 DA 6 2, 13, t. 2, 486–8.
35 DA 8 1, 10, t. 3, 22–24.
confusedly or concretely with *per se* sensibles. They constitute a part of *per se* sensibles.\(^3^6\) Considering the importance of “accidental sensation” in our sensory cognition, which, concisely speaking, can be expressed as “seeing as”–we see the white object as our friend Peter–, it would be odd if Suárez did not concede this kind of cognition to the senses as well. In fact, Suárez himself speaks of the phantasm of Peter which serves as an exemplar for the formation of the intelligible species, which represents the individual who was represented by the phantasm.\(^3^7\) At the same time, however, Suárez stresses the difference between the intellect–the power which is capable of “intus legens”–and the senses, which remain within the ambit of “externorum accidentium sensibilium”.\(^3^8\) Considering both statements, we can infer that for Suárez there are actually only two kinds of cognition of incidental sensibles. While these sensibles are grasped by the external senses confusedly, the only more perfected knowledge is accomplished by the intellect. No other, middle, cognition reserved for the interior sense is necessary and possible at the same time.

This conclusion can be first of all confirmed by Suárez’s denial of a distinct *species non sensata*, which in Aquinas represented also incidental sensibles. In addition to the external senses, the only additional cognitive value comes with the discursive operation of the intellect. Only an intellectual discourse oriented at first to the various species of accidens can lead to the elicitation of an intelligible species representing their substratum, namely a substance. Clearly, accidents are what our intellect apprehends first, not a substance or a universal essence. Taking into account the overall parallelism between metaphysics and epistemology—an important item in the systematic thought of thinkers such as Suárez—it can be said that if Suárez does not explain the individuality of accidents in terms of their subject, or, in other words, if they are individuated by themselves, they can be intellectually grasped at the beginning of concept formation without the conceptual involvement of substance. Concluding, only the intellect, not the interior sense, can infer a more perfect cognition of a subject from the conception and discursive elaboration of its accidents.\(^3^9\)

In his critique of Aquinas’s attribution of judicial and discursive operations to the *cogitativa*, Suárez premises two notes about two kinds of judgments. In *DA* 5, 6, while analysing the issue of the operations of apprehension and judgment and the question of how these acts are distributed in the powers, Suárez distinguishes two kinds of *iudicium*. The first kind called judgment in

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\(^{36}\) *DA* 6, 1, 2–3, t. 2, 456.


\(^{38}\) *DA* 9, 4, 1, t. 3, 152.

\(^{39}\) *DA* 9, 4, 7, t. 3, 162.
the broad sense is judgment \textit{in actu exercito}. This judgment goes hand in hand with apprehension itself. Since every simple and also complex apprehension, say of a proposition, is a vital operation, this operation is not only \textit{in actu exercito} aware of itself, but by the very same act the visual power also judges that it sees this or that colour. The second kind of \textit{iudicium} called judgment in the \textit{proper} sense amounts to the collation of one extreme to the other extreme. In this collation, a cognitive power composes while apprehending a connection of the terms, or divides when grasping a disconnection of the terms.\footnote{DA 5, 6, 5, t. 2, 416.}

While Suárez concedes judgment in the broad sense to all the senses--this judgment is intrinsically “immersed” (\textit{imbibitur}) in all their acts--, he denies proper judgment to both beastly and human interior senses. He says that “Nullus etiam sensus interior hominis potest apprehendere, vel iudicare, sive componendo, sive dividendo, unde tale iudicium excedit limites potentiae sensitivae in universum.”\footnote{Cf. Francisco Suárez, “Tractatus De anima,” in \textit{Opera omnia}, vol. 3, edited by A. D. M. André (Paris: L. Vivés, 1856), lib. III, cap. VI, n. 8, 639. Castellote’s edition states imprecisely: “Nullus etiam sensus interior hominis potest apprehendere vel iudicare componendo et dividendo. Unde huiusmodi iudicium in universum excedit limites potentiae cognoscitivae”, \textit{DA} 5, 6, 15, t. 2, 430.} Immediately after this conclusion the Jesuit appends: “Huic conclusion non omnes consentiunt …” Aquinas and Cajetan, among others, are mentioned as representatives of the discordant view. The general thrust of Suárez’s long argument against their contrary view is based on relegating all the above mentioned acts, which Aquinas had attributed to the \textit{cogitativa}, to the intellect. The Jesuit rejects the argument based on the Axiom of Continuity. The judgments that proceed \textit{componendo et dividendo} and reasoning exceed the capacity of all the material powers. No matter how close the \textit{cogitativa} stands to the intellect, it still remains “intra latitudinem potentiae materialis”\footnote{DA 5, 6, 16, t. 2, 432.}. Moreover, if the \textit{cogitativa} could function \textit{componendo et dividendo}, it could proceed discursively by collating one proposition with another, and it could also order means to their proper ends. There would be no reason to affirm the former and to deny the latter. However, if that were the case, apprehension of good and bad intentions would have to be conceded to the interior sense as well. If it operated discursively, the internal sense could, with a certain degree of freedom, order means to ends. No doubt, this would lead to the conclusion that the sensitive appetite of itself would have some kind of imperfect liberty. By itself it would be capable of receiving virtues and of
committing a pardonable sin (*peccatum veniale*). Suárez regarded all these consequences as utterly absurd.\(^{43}\)

### 4.3. MEMORY

In its memorative function the *phantasia* retains the species and elicits the acts of the sensibles which are represented by the species *in absentia*. In juxtaposition with the intellect, Suárez specifies its function in the following way: While the interior sense cognizes a past thing materially, the intellect can know it formally, i.e., it can know *praeteritio* as such or it apprehends the *ratio temporis* together with the *ratio* of temporal differences. In any case, memory in the most proper sense is not sense memory but intellectual memory: “*Intellectus est proprissime memoria et multo perfectior quam in parte sensitiva*”.\(^{44}\) This is contrary to what Aquinas says: “Si vero de ratione memoriae sit quod eius obiectum sit praeteritum, ut praeteritum; memoria in parte intellectiva non erit, sed sensitiva tantum, quae est apprehensiva particularium. Praeteritum enim, ut praeteritum, cum significet esse sub determinato tempore, ad conditionem particularis pertinent.”\(^{45}\) Memory is related to pastness as pastness, which means that its domain is the realm of singularity. The universal natures are necessary and supertemporal. However, as is well-known, for Aquinas singularity is only the object of the senses, not of the intellect, since the intellect is limited to universal apprehension. When memory is defined as being of singulars, and since the intellect’s domain is universality, there can be no intellectual memory.

The “theoretical space” which Suárez achieved by affirming the existence of intellectual memory seems to be the reason why he indicated the discursive operations, which Aquinas had attributed to sense memory alias *reminiscентia*, as acts of the intellect. Although there is memory in both brutes and humans, this sense memory does not recollect. The Jesuit is aware of the ambiguous position of Aristotle who in his *De memoria et reminiscęentia*, on the one hand, claims that (discursive) reminiscence is a sense power pertaining to a sense faculty (451a17–8), while, on the other, at the beginning of the same treatise he asserts that “… the quick-witted and those who learn easily are better at recollecting” (449b7–8).\(^{46}\) The latter seems to attribute recollection to the

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43 DA 5, 6, 17, t. 2, 432–5; for these (for Suárez absurd) consequences cf. also DA 11, 3, 3, t. 3, 358–362.
44 DA 9, 10, 5, t. 3, 266.
45 Aquinas, *STh*. I, 79, 6, co., 270.
intellect. However, in his verbal conciliatory approach, Suárez leaves no doubt which position is right: “… reminiscentiam potissime fieri ab intellectu, saltem ad discursum et compositiones …” He stresses that the interior sense is not “present” in the acts of reminiscence actively, i.e., as the proximate subject but only collaterally. Since *in statu isto* the intellect can go along only with the operation of the interior sense, so when the intellect recollects, the *phantasia* has to attend to these operations of recollection as well. However, its tracking (*indagatio*) does not run through its proper discourse but only by means of a mechanical succession of apprehensions, which are essentially dependent on prior intellectual discourse.

V. CONCLUSION

In his recent book *Aquinas’s Theory of Perception. An Analytical Reconstruction* Anthony Lisska says that Aquinas’s philosophy of perception would be an embarrassment without the *vis cogitativa*. As I have tried to show, for Suárez, on the contrary, postulating this interior sense would be such an embarrassment. How is it possible? And what are his main systematic motivations for such an emphatic reduction of the broad functional scope of interior sense apprehension that Aquinas had endorsed? James South says that one of Suárez’s motivations was to give an epistemological privilege to the external senses. This seems to me to be only partially true. As I have said, not the external senses themselves but rather the soul inherent in the operations accounted for the fact that, alongside with the external object, a percipient is collaterally aware of the operation by means of which the external sensible is apprehended. Again, the soul also made possible that the interior sense could perceive the act of external sensation in a special way, i.e., through a modification of the species representing the external proper sensible. The efficiently operative soul in its operations—the principle of intentional attention—was also

47 DA 8, 1, 12, t. 3, 24.
48 DA 8, 1, 12, t. 3, 24–6.
50 South, “Francisco Suárez on Imagination,” 134.
51 The issue of the efficient causality of the soul and substantial forms in general is at present one of the most debated topic in the research field of Suárez’s metaphysics and philosophy of mind in general. The theory of the soul’s efficient causal agency toward its powers and its operations, which is presented by Suárez both in his *Metaphysical disputations* (especially in the oft-cited disputation 18, the question 5) and in the *Commentary on De anima* (esp. *DA* 3, 3), can be seen as the important metaphysical background of the Jesuit’s soul-centred cognitive theory. The topic of this systematic interconnection is still awaiting elaboration. As regards the studies devoted to the subject of Suárez’s efficient causality of the soul see, among others, Dominik Perler, “Faculties in Medieval Philosophy”,
the reason why Suárez conceded judgment in actu exercito to both the external and the interior senses. I have argued that, systematically speaking, this attribution can be regarded as the reason for Suárez’s (implicit) claim about the irrelevance of a middle kind of judgment, which would be made by the interior sense. To put it tersely, the soul took over a job which in Aquinas had been exercised by the cogitative power.

Beside extending the cognitive competences of the external senses and the soul, an important reason for Suárez’s limitation of the functional scope of the phantasia is his view of the intellect and, in particular, his special interpretation of the Aristotelian dictum about the necessity of the (human) intellect’s “conversio ad phantasmata”. While Aquinas asserted that the intellect needs to turn back to phantasms, above all, because its proper object is the quiddity of a material thing, and thus after having conceived the universal nature it must go back to the phantasms representing individuals, Suárez’s interpretation is different. At first the intellect forms the concept of a singular and only later it conceives the notion of a universal. Both singulars and universals are a part of the proper object of the intellect. There is no need to postulate a sensory power similar to the cogitativa to substitute for some cognitive deficiency of the intellect.

No doubt, Suárez’s rejection of the “intellectuality” of the vis cogitativa leads to a certain “dualization” of the material and the immaterial powers in the human composite. Surely, the intellect and the interior sense cease to be unified by the intermediary vis cogitativa. In line with this “dualization”, Suárez explicitly says that the intellect’s dependency upon phantasms is a consequence of the (still natural) imperfection of the intellect’s “embodied” status. In statu isto the intellect is operative only if the phantasy is operative, simply because both powers are rooted in the common soul. Only the soul in this intermediary


52 For the accent on this distinction see also South, “Francisco Suárez on Imagination,” 156–7.

53 Aquinas, STh. 1, 84, 7, co., 325: “Intellectus autem humani, qui est coniunctus corpori, proprium objectum est quidditas sive natura in materia corporali existens… De ratione autem huius naturae est, quod in aliquo individuo existat, quod non est absque materia corporali, sicut de ratione naturae lapidis est quod sit in hoc lapide, et de ratione naturae equi quod sit in hoc equo, et sic de aliis. Unde natura lapidis, vel cuiuscumque materialis rei, cognosci non potest complete et vere, nisi secundum quod cognoscitur ut in particulari existens. Particulare autem apprehendimus per sensum et imaginationem. Et ideo necesse est ad hoc quod intellectus actu intelligat suum objectum proprium, quod convertat se ad phantasmata…”

54 DA 9, 7, 8, t. 3, 206–8.
function is conceived as the means of unification by Suárez. The soul, not the “semi-intellectual” capacity of the cogitative power, constitutes the main principle of the unity of the material and immaterial powers in Suárez’s anthropology.

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