, Pareyson and “Evil (Nothing) in God”: Notes for a Comparison with Classical Metaphysics

Abstract

In his posthumous work Ontologia della libertà, Luigi Pareyson questions the problem of evil not so much from the point of view of human freedom, but rather in relation to that “abyss of freedom” that would be divine reality. Developing a thought that presents clear analogies with that of the last Schelling, Pareyson conceives of “nothing” as a moment of the Absolute, which is determined according to a dialectic of positive and negative within which the origin of being and the possibility of the existence of evil find their place. In this paper, reasons are given why this critique of any possible theodicy is untenable – even before its conception of the nature of evil – in its very logical-metaphysical “foundations,” or in its attempt to free itself from metaphysical discourse on God.