Ontological Models and Set Theory. An Interpretation of "Russell's Paradox"
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Abstract
In the antinomy known as Russell's paradox, a logical contradiction emerges that had already been mantanined by sophistry in the face of the ontological discourse that has founded Western philosophy. We argue, on the basis of a study of the logic underlying Cantor's set theory, whose ontological discourse supports infinite ontic variations, that the antinomy arises if consistency and completeness, which belong to a formal logical model inspired by the Aristotelian principle of non-contradiction, are admitted as truth conditions. This interpretation is confirmed by a brief analysis of Russell's theory of types.
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